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Constitutionalizing Connectivity: The Constitutional Grid of
World Society
Poul F. Kjaer*
Global law settings are characterized by a structural pre-eminence of
connectivity norms, a type of norm which differs from coherency or
possibility norms. The centrality of connectivity norms emerges from
the function of global law, which is to increase the probability of
transfers of condensed social components, such as economic capital
and products, religious doctrines, and scientific knowledge, from one
legally structured context to another within world society. This was the
case from colonialism and colonial law to contemporary global supply
chains and human rights. Both colonial law and human rights can be
understood as serving a constitutionalizing function aimed at stabiliz-
ing and facilitating connectivity. This allows for an understanding of
colonialism and contemporary global governance as functional, but
not as normative, equivalents.
INTRODUCTION
This article proposes an epistemological shift within the ongoing debate on
the metamorphosis of constitutionalism. A shift away from a focus on
differentiation to a focus on connectivity, that is, a focus on inter-systemic,
rather than intra-systemic, processes, as also expressed in the notion of
interlegality originally coined by Boaventura de Sousa Santos at a speech at
Cardiff University.1 Systems theoretical approaches to constitutionalism
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have, as a consequence of the architecture and basic assumptions of the
theory, a primary focus on the inner worlds of systems and the constitutive
and limiting functions of law in relation to focal social processes, such as the
economy, the mass media, politics, science, and so forth.2 While the
internalistic perspective is both necessary and fruitful, it implies a de-
emphasizing of the issue of connectivity, that is, the question of how the
probability of sustained and continued social communication flows is
increased on a global scale within a world characterized by multi-
contextuality. Without dismissing the crucial question concerning the `inner
integrity' of systemically organized communication and the role of legal
norms in achieving such integrity, the issue focused on here is the classical
sociological question of `how is society possible?3 under the structural
condition of the existence of world society and the role of legal norms and
constitutions in this regard. The point of departure is, therefore, not a
dismissal of systems theory but, rather, the development of an outlook which
stands orthogonal, an outlook which is complementary, to classical systems-
theoretical perspectives, thereby filling a blind spot through a strategy of
theoretical metamorphosis starting from within systems theory and ending
somewhere else.
The notion of world society, that is, the proposition that only one society
exists in our world, is central to systems theory. It refers to the Husserlian
notion of common horizons of opportunity, and thereby stipulates a potential
of connectivity on a global scale. This article goes beyond the very general
proposition of world society advanced by Niklas Luhmann through an
understanding of global legal norms as instruments of connectivity which
play a significant role in the realization of world society. Drawing on a rich
literature concerning the function of legal norms, the perspective will be
developed that legal norms not only limit connectivity but also serve as
enablers of connectivity. This is central for our understanding of the position
and function of global legal norms, as world society, paradoxically, consists
of many worlds. World society is an acentric society which is not only
horizontally differentiated between function systems, but also vertically
differentiated between social processes relying on local, national, and trans-
national organizing principles.4 Also paradoxically, increased globalization
has, furthermore, resulted in an increase, rather than a demise, of contextual
diversity. The logic of differentiation associated with the acentric world
society therefore has to be complemented by the logic of connectivity. It is
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against this background that global legal norms have emerged as instruments
of connectivity.
Apart from the classical function of norms in relation to the stabilization
of expectations, global legal norms are specifically aimed at the structuration
of transfers, that is, the extraction, transmission, and implantation of
condensed social components (Sinnkomponente) from one context to
another. This is the case in relation to all functional systems in so far as
such transfers can be observed in relation to political decisions, legal judg-
ments, economic capital and products, scientific knowledge, and so forth. It
is through their orientation towards such transfers that global legal norms
obtain a role as connectivity-enhancing instruments.
This is also reflected in the evolutionary transformation of the legal norms
aimed at stabilizing globally unfolding processes. One of the most central,
perhaps the most central, structural transformation with which contemporary
law and social sciences are grappling, is the still ongoing decentring of the
world after the implosion of the Eurocentric world and the gradual decline of
the Western-centric world. This transformation has not yet been fully con-
ceptually and empirically understood, leaving the world in a vacuum of
uncertainty.5 Looking specifically at the institutionally embedded legal
infrastructure of world society, this transformation can also be understood as
a structural transformation from colonialism to contemporary transnational
governance and human rights. Both colonialism and contemporary trans-
national governance go far beyond a mere focus on the economy, while, at
the same time, the structuring of economic transfers remains central to both.6
Zooming in on the economic dimension, one might empirically observe a
shift from the economic dimension of colonialism to global supply chains as
the central change in the structuring of global processes of economic
transfers. Both colonialism and contemporary global supply chains rely on
legal instruments, and both are characterized by a hierarchy of norms, which
enable one to speak of their constitutionalization. The substantial norms
upon which they rely are, however, very different, thereby allowing for an
understanding of the economic dimension of colonialism and global supply
chains as functional, but not as normative, equivalents. Or, to express it
differently: the transformation from colonialism to global supply chains
implies a fundamental shift in the constitutional grid of world society.
The article proceeds as follows: the first two steps are context-denoting
exercises, briefly outlining the contours of world society and of global law.
This is followed by the location of the approach advanced within the existing
theoretical landscape highlighting the ambition to carve a path between
unifying and radical pluralist approaches to global law. This ambition is
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substantiated in the two subsequent steps through the development of the
notion of connectivity norms as a particular type of legal norm which, for
structural reasons, tend to gain prominence in relation to globally unfolding
social processes, and through a brief reconstruction of the central stages of
the transformation from the economic dimension of colonialism to global
supply chains and human rights. The article ends with a discussion of the
implications of the findings for our understanding of constitutionalism in
world society.
THE SOCIETAL CONTEXT: THE EMERGENCE OF WORLD SOCIETY
When introducing the concept of world society in the early 1970s, Luhmann
encapsulated a whole string of developments which, several decades later,
became part of the broader narrative on globalization.7 The core element of
Luhmann's concept of world society is the Husserlian concept of intentional
horizons,8 to which he gave a twist by arguing that, in world society, the
social world in its entirety shares a common pool of potential experiences.
Luhmann stipulated a process characterized by a fusion of horizons
(Horizontverschmelzung) in Gadamer's sense.9 As the concept of horizons
are embedded in ± and indeed constituted in ± time, this development is
furthermore closely linked to the emergence of world time as developed in
the latter half of the nineteenth century, that is, a unitary concept of time
enabling communication throughout the world without losing time.10
One might identify three phases in the historical emergence of world
society: first, the European discovery of the world as a singular globe in the
wake of the scientific and exploratory sightings of the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries and the concordant development of a singular ± Eurocentric ± legal
order claiming to be valid for the world in its entirety.11 Second, the
emergence of a synchronized world which, as already mentioned, manifested
itself in the emergence of world time from the 1850s onwards, a develop-
ment which took place in the wake of technological changes, such as the
steam ship, railways and the telegraph, as well as the second wave of
European (and Japanese and United States) imperialist expansion leading to
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the succumbing of the world in its entirety to globally unfolding and
connected processes.12 This is expressed in the globalization of function
systems in relation to the economy, law, the mass media, politics, science,
and so forth, and is also reflected in semantic articulations such as the `world
economy', `world politics', and `world literature'.13 Third: the intensifica-
tion of these processes from the 1960s onwards, as foreseen by Luhmann,
through steady increases in global communication flows in the wake of new
technologies, such as container shipping, satellite communication, and the
Internet, as well as profound changes in the legal and regulatory set-ups, as,
for example, reflected in the liberalization of capital flows during the last
decades of the twentieth century, which led to a massive intensification of
social exchanges with a global reach.
However, in spite of this development, the concept of world society
remains underdetermined.14 Systems theory stipulates the predominance of
functional differentiation throughout world society. Indeed, the global
systems of the economy, mass media, politics, and so forth, do exist today, a
development which implies that other forms of differentiation such as centre/
periphery, stratification, and segmentary differentiation increasingly become
internal, and thus secondary, forms of differentiation unfolding within
functionally-delineated systems. This is, for example, reflected in stratified
global rankings within the area of higher education or the reliance on centre/
periphery for the organization of global finance through the City in London
and Wall Street in New York within the economic system. Questions,
however, arise concerning the depth and degree of advancement of this
development. The parts of the world where modernity, defined as the
primacy of functional differentiation,15 has gained outright dominance
remain limited to a rather small part of the world, most notably, the North
Atlantic area. Global cities characterized by strong elements of modernity
exist throughout the world,16 but, in most parts of the world, functional
differentiation continues to stand in an orthogonal relationship to other forms
of differentiation (centre/periphery, segmentary and stratificatory differentia-
tion) in a manner which makes the thesis of an outright dominance of
functional differentiation empirically questionable.17 This might, of course,
merely be a matter of `causality in the south'.18 But social evolution is blind
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and no guarantee exists for a future duplication of the modernization which
unfolded in large segments of Europe and North America in the rest of the
world. Only the current condition remains observable, a condition which can
also be seen as characterized by crossbreeding and creolization, that is, a
mixing of different types of communication, in a manner which evades the
claim to `purity' inherent to function systems.19 So, although function
systems do have global reach, they operate, in most contexts, in a manner
which is characterized by a limited degree of distillation and only act as a
thin layer of varnish spread out `on top' of far more deep-seated forms of
communication.20 This is, for example, observable in post-colonial contexts
in which interstices have emerged between the operations of formalized
systems imposed from the outside and the pre-existing logics of organizing
communication.21
THE LEGAL CONTEXT: THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL LAW
The gradual emergence, and intensification, of social exchanges within
world society has been accompanied by, and, to a large extent, also been
created by, a concordant appearance of global law as an emerging legal field.
Emergent in so far as it still remains `incomplete', making it a legal
phenomenon, rather than a fully-fledged legal (sub)system.22 This is the case
as the delineation of the phenomenon of global law vis-aÁ-vis national,
international, transnational, as well as local community-based law remains
blurred. National law has, from a classical positivist perspective, been
understood as the internal law of nation states as derived from the concept of
sovereignty. Classical international law is, as a reflection of the concept of
national law, typically understood as the law between states, allowing for a
conceptual exclusion of types of law, or law-like, phenomena which do not
fit into its inter-state conceptual frame.23 Transnational law can be
understood as a category of any law which, one way or the other, in terms
of jurisdiction, source or effect, crosses national borders. Hence, trans-
national law, in its original meaning, refers mainly ± though not exclusively
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± to the external effects of national law.24 It is against this background that
the more recent notion of global law has emerged. Global law can, according
to Neil Walker, refer to the mere rhetorical usage of the term `global', for
example, by law firms that present themselves as global actors. It can refer to
a specific type of law with a (near) global reach, mainly referring to
globally-acting institutions such as the United Nations or the World Trade
Organization. However, in contrast to such perspectives, Walker
conceptualizes global law as any type of law, irrespective of its origin or
orientation, which in principle is, or can be, unlimited in its reach. Thus,
global law claims ± or can potentially claim ± validity without reference to or
being limited by a specific territory or population, although, for material and
practical reasons, it will be limited in most cases.25 Against this background,
Walker considers EU law to represent the incarnation of global law, as it
operates in a manner which means it is not strictly linked to territorial
delineations just as there are, in principle, no limitations to its reach.26
While this universalizing dimension is a central feature of global law, one
might, however, add two dimensions which give additional substance to the
notion: in-between-ness and transfer. The basic structure of world society as
characterized by global function systems, while faced with substantial
indeterminacy in most parts of the world concerning the relationship
between the different logics of differentiation and the increased internal
fragmentation of function systems, implies that different function systems
reconfigure this indeterminacy in different ways. In particular, although not
just for the global systems of law and politics, this is expressed through a
three-layer world. Whereas Luhmannian systems theory focuses solely on
the horizontal fixation of function systems, which, in principle, enjoy equal
status, a central element of world society is that it is also characterized by a
vertical layering between local, national, and transnational processes.27 It is
in this complex matrix that a multitude of observations, transfers, and
collisions between contextually-embedded units located both within the
same layer and within different layers takes place. Global law can thus be
defined as a universally applicable legal phenomenon of the `in-between',28
which is materially aimed at facilitating the separation, transmission, and
incorporation of social components from one legally-structured context to
another. Global law might, therefore, also be understood as a decentred
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phenomenon manifested in inter-legality,29 which is universal in so far as it
can appear in an infinite number of settings throughout the globe at the same
time as it is a type of law which produces autonomous effects on the world:
global law is not just reproducing `structural couplings' or `black boxes'
merely serving as transmission belts between different (sub)systems. On the
contrary, the structuring of the separation, transmission, and incorporation of
condensed social components from one (sub)system to another by global law
implies (as we will return to later) that the condensed social components and
the meaning ascribed to them is changed in the process of separation,
transmission, and incorporation. Or, to express it differently: what is
separated is not equal to what is incorporated.
THE APPROACH: CARVING A THIRD WAY BETWEEN
UNIFICATION AND PLURALISM
A general implication of the above insight is that systems theory needs to be
complemented with a theory of the `in-between' which stands in an
orthogonal relationship to systems theory itself. Such an undertaking goes
beyond the scope of this article, but looking into global law might, however,
provide some clues concerning the direction.30
Global law relies on and combines elements from local, national,
international, and transnational law, while also reproducing legal figures of
its own. International public law, defined as the rules and norms guiding
relations between governments and other state entities, as well as private
international law, understood as rules for selecting the applicable law and
type of contract in cross-border constellations, including the issue of court
competence in cases of dispute,31 can both serve as vehicles of global law.
The same goes for the academic discipline of comparative law which has, as
its core element, the comparison of different legal systems, and, as such,
provides a foundation for the divergences which international public and
private law focuses upon and thus also provides for any possible
harmonization efforts. As such, comparative law, as an academic discipline,
can be seen as producing performative effects which are essential for global
law. International economic law, defined as the rules and norms guiding
cross-border economic transactions and including sub-fields such as trade
and investment law, as well as the disputed phenomenon of lex mercatoria,
the body of principles guiding cross-border commercial contracts, are also
phenomena which provide essential building-blocks for global law at the
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same time as the notion of global law becomes broader by going beyond
economic transactions and by stipulating a broader contextual impact `on
society as such', rather than merely dealing with economic logics.32
With the emphasis on the decentred universality of global law, a path is
formed between the major positions dealing with global law to date: unifying
and pluralist, or convergence- and divergence-oriented, perspectives. The
unifying perspective has been most clearly developed from within inter-
national public law, that is, positions which claim the existence of a singular
hierarchy of legal norms in world society, typically seen as embedded in the
law of the United Nations and an understanding of the UN Charter as a
`constitution for the world' upon the basis of a claim to normative
singularity.33 A loosely system-theoretically inspired variant of this has
emerged through the claim that a singular legal system is constitutive for the
world, as such, providing the (international) public law dimension of the
legal system with a foundational position as the meta-system which con-
stitutes society.34 But also within (international) private law, harmonizing
efforts have been central, as expressed in the attempt to establish a European
civil code project35 and the call for a singular global commercial code.36 In
contrast, pluralist perspectives have highlighted the fundamental acentric
and non-hierarchical nature of law in world society, emphasizing a reworked
conflict-of-laws perspectives for a fragmented world37 and the political
dimension of legal diversity.38
This paradoxical unity of diversity can, however, be dissolved through
recourse to time, to a historical unfolding of the evolution of global law and
global legal norms: a historical sociology of law approach aimed at analys-
ing the functional pull leading to the emergence of global legal norms,
combined with an evolutionary theory approach aimed at the transformation
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of global legal norms over time, and the internal and external effects
produced through such norms.39 From such a perspective, a key insight is
that global legal norms in a particular imperial, that is, transcendental and
universal, form preceded Westphalian (nation-)state law.40 In addition, it can
be observed that modern nation-state law and the law of modern trans-
national governance co-emerged over a century-long process in a dialectic-
ally and mutually reinforcing relationship.41 This was a process which,
simply put, came in two phases: first, the gradual emergence of territorial
states in western Europe from the sixteenth century onwards and the con-
comitant and simultaneous build-up of large-scale colonial empires with a
global reach upon the basis of global colonial law. Second, the globalization
of statehood through the structural transformation initiated with the
breakdown of the central and eastern European empires in the wake of the
First World War, which subsequently expanded throughout the globe via
mid-twentieth century decolonialization, combined with a concomitant
replacement of colonialism and colonial law with contemporary global
governance and law.42
THE PROBLEM: THE PRESTATION OF GLOBAL NORMS
The structure of world society and global law as described above poses the
classical sociological question, `how is society possible?'43 in a new light.
The progressive decentring of first, the Eurocentric, and in our time, the
Western-centric world implies that, paradoxically, growing globalization has
increased, rather than diminished, the decentredness of world society.44 The
issue of connectivity in the decentred world society has therefore become a
crucial, and maybe the most crucial, question of our time. This development
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might amount to a shift from a relative predominance of logics of
differentiation to an increased centrality of logics of connectivity, that is,
inter-systemic connectivity.45 How do systems increase the probability of
connectivity in relation to globally unfolding processes marked by an
indeterminacy concerning which form of differentiation is the primary one in
large segments of the world, and especially in situations which imply
connectivity between components of communication situated in different
contexts characterized by different constellations and primacies of the forms
of differentiation? And how does the internal fragmentation of function
systems affect such processes?
As a reflection of this state of affairs, new types of intermediaries have
emerged which tend to be network-based and rely on legal instruments for
their stabilization.46 Global supply chains, the global human rights regime,
and the climate change regime are examples of such intermediary structures.
Strategically, they tend to be located within a single function system such as
the economic, the legal or the imaginary but, nonetheless, socially real
system of the ecological environment, at the same time as their raison d'eÃtre
is a double one: to produce internal coherency and connectivity within their
respective function systems on a global scale and externally to recon-
textualize communicative components when they are transferred from one
context to another, for example, from a context characterized by a primacy
of functional differentiation to a context where such primacy is not manifest
or vice versa. Their function is therefore to reproduce a paradoxical unity
between function systems and multiple social contexts, as defined by the
involved systems, while facilitating the transfer of condensed social
components between such contexts.
In world society, the central issue of connectivity is therefore one of
transfer. Following Rudolf Stichweh, the transfer of condensed social
components (Sinnkomponente), as is known from the literature on legal
transfers, has at least five characteristics. First, `the objects of transfer' are
compact and distilled units of meaning, such as political/bureaucratic deci-
sions, legal judgments, economic products, economic capital, and scientific
or technological knowledge, all of which are clearly demarcated and possess
a clear functional orientation. Second, an act of transfer implies that the
transferred unit(s) possess significant information value which is likely to be
both recognizable and able to produce an impact in the receiving context.
Third, transfer implies boundary crossings, in so far as the units are
dispatched from one context to another in a manner which is conceived of as
a boundary crossing by both the dispatching and the receiving systems.
Fourth, transfer implies distance, either spatially and/or in terms of time.
S124
45 Kjaer, op. cit., n. 30, p. 77.
46 P.F. Kjaer, `The Metamorphosis of the Functional Synthesis: A Continental European
Perspective on Governance, Law and the Political in the Transnational Space' (2010)
Wisconsin Law Rev. 489.
ß 2018 The Author. Journal of Law and Society ß 2018 Cardiff University Law School
Fifth, a certain permanence needs to be observable, typically based upon a
repetition of the processes of the dispatch and receipt of the condensed social
components which are similar, or at least recognizable as similar, over a
longer time span.47
Adding to Stichweh's list, one might, however, argue that norms of
transfer and connectivity are constitutive for increasing the probability of
successful transfers. When introducing the concept of world society,
Luhmann advanced the `speculative hypothesis' that the emergence of
world society would imply a relative reduction in the centrality of normative
expectations and a relative increase in the centrality of cognitive
expectations for the reproduction of world society. Social phenomena and
processes which rely heavily on normative expectations, such as law,
politics, and morality will, according to Luhmann's expectation, lose out
while the economy, technology, and science which, he argues, are charac-
terized by a stronger reliance on cognitive expectations, will gain in
centrality.48 Normative expectations are understood here as expectations
which are upheld even if not fulfilled, thereby making them into contra-
factually stabilized expectations, whereas cognitive expectations are under-
stood as expectations which are changed in the event of non-fulfilment.49
Twenty years before the publication of JuÈrgen Habermas's Between Facts
and Norms (FaktizitaÈt und Geltung) which, as reflected in the original title,
departs from a basic distinction between the factual and the normative,
Luhmann had explicitly dismissed this distinction and replaced it with a
distinction between normative and cognitive expectations. One of the
advantages of this is to highlight that normative based contra-factual
expectations are as real as cognitive expectations. The social world is
characterized by a doubling of reality (RealitaÈtsverdopplung) between the
factually existing world and equally real communicatively articulated contra-
factual visions of how the world should be.50
While accepting the latter point concerning the doubling of reality and the
equally real reality of normative based communication, one might, however,
question the empirical validity of the former, concerning a relative reduction
in the centrality of normativity, expressed through expectations, in world
society. Globally unfolding processes do not rely on norms to a lesser extent
than more locally or nationally embedded processes.51 Rather, they rely on a
specific subtype of norm different from those norms associated with local or
national unfolding processes.
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Within analytical philosophy, the core focus of norms is the issue of
validity, that is, whether a given norm is the right one or not.52 However,
from a sociological perspective, the issue of validity is not the central
question. Instead, two contrasting views appear to which one might add a
third one which is particular relevant for globally unfolding processes:
· Coherency norms: within a `traditional' sociological perspective, norms
tend to be seen as `instruments of collectivity', which is aimed at
establishing coherency within a group, such as a tribe or a nation, through
the prescription of specific actions, which are considered as desirable for
the members of the group, prescriptions which are combined with an
injunction, that is, a sanction, aimed at increasing the probability of future
compliance with the norm by members of the group.53
· Possibility norms: from this perspective, a norm introduces a distinction
through a distance to the factually existing social reality as perceived in a
given social context, through the introduction of a contra-factual per-
spective. Possibility norms are, in direct opposition to coherency norms,
instruments through which possible alternatives to the given social reality
are unfolded, thereby marking possible futures in a manner which
accentuates the openness, rather than the reticence, of the future.54
· Connectivity norms: it is in contrast to the above two perspectives that one
might introduce a third variant particularly suited for global contexts,
combining elements of the two previous ones while also going beyond
them. Here, norms are considered as instruments aimed at facilitating the
separation, transmission, and incorporation of social components from
one context to another. They are oriented towards the separation of social
components from one social context, and provide guiding principles for
their transmission and incorporation into other context(s) while relying on
sanctions as well as inducing reflexive learning mechanisms vis-aÁ-vis
agents based in different contexts in order to increase contra-factually the
probability of successful transfers in the future.
Connectivity norms increase possibilities, in so far as they are aimed at
opening up the possibility of transfers while at the same time very much
aimed at ensuring compatibility between processes unfolding in different
contexts, a form of compatibility which implies that the stabilization of
processes of transfer, rather than the opening up of possibilities, takes
precedence, as compatibility does not amount to an intention to establish
coherence within a collectivity. But, at the same time, the notion of
S126
52 See, for example, C. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (1996).
53 J. Blake and K. Davis, `Norms, Values and Sanctions' in Handbook of Modern
Sociology, ed. R.E.L. Faris (1964) 456; H. HydeÂn, Normvetenskap (2002) 96 ff.; T.
Parsons, The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social Theory with Special
Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers (1968/1937).
54 N. Luhmann, Rechtssystem und Rechtsdogmatik (1974); C. MoÈllers, Die MoÈglichkeit
der Normen: UÈ ber eine Praxis jenseits von MoralitaÈt und KausalitaÈt (2015) 13 ff.
ß 2018 The Author. Journal of Law and Society ß 2018 Cardiff University Law School
collectivity remains crucial in so far as increasing the probability of transfers
implies the development of internal images, or imaginaries, of collectivity
within both the departing and receiving systems, which are typically
manifested in legal constructions of collectivity, for example, through legal
notions of `the nation' or `the community', which serves as the addressees of
transfers.
The three norm dimensions can also be seen as representing the three
meaning dimensions of any social process: the substantial, the temporal, and
the social.55 This again highlights that all three dimensions are always
present within a given norm while the weight between them will differ in
relation to different types of social processes and in different contextual
circumstances. In praxis, the three dimensions of norms provide three
different types of intentionality as expressed in the objects against which the
norms are oriented, namely, collectivities, articulated futures, and acts of
transfer, while each of them predominantly rely on three different types of
instruments in their intention to bridge the factual and non-factuality:
punishment, programmes articulating possible futures, or processes of
maintaining connectivity.
Global legal norms are, according to the argument advanced here, over-
whelmingly oriented towards the connectivity dimension, to the extent that
one might argue that the prestation (Leistung) of global legal norms is to
increase the probability of connectivity. This, for example, is the case in
relation to the micro-economic constitution of the European Union, the
constitution of the internal market.56 The internal market might be seen as a
paradigmatic case of a legal constitution of a substantial social process,
namely, economic exchange, which is aimed at increasing economic con-
nectivity across diverse legally-entrenched contexts through the introduction
of a hierarchy of norms as expressed through the four freedoms for goods,
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Table 1. The three norm dimensions
Norm dimensions Coherency Possibility Connectivity
Types of meaning Substantial Time Social
Objects of Collectivities Articulated futures Acts of transfer
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Instruments of Punishment Programmes Processes
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capital, services, and labour. A constitution which, furthermore, has no
prescribed territorial limits as expressed by the inclusion of the European
Economic Area (Iceland, Lichtenstein, and Norway) as well as the partial
inclusion of a whole string of other jurisdictions.
FROM COLONIALISM TO GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS
The internal market was already laid down in the Treaty of Rome of 1957
and its realization was inherently linked to the implosion of both continental
and overseas European empires and the progressive decentring of the
eurocentric world which followed from these implosions.57 It is therefore not
surprising that what is now known as European Union law has gained the
status as the prototype of contemporary global law.58 In spite of the avant-
garde position of European Union law, it only represents one species of
global law, as legally-entrenched norms of connectivity can be observed
throughout world society. Phenomena such as ecological communication, in
relation to climate change, or migration and global health management, in
relation to the epidemic diseases, the global tourism infrastructure as well as
global infrastructures, in relation to telecommunication and the Internet or
aviation and shipping logistics,59 are all bound on norms of connectivity and
global law.
Two other examples include global supply chains and the global human
rights regime. The former is predominantly linked to (international) private
law while the latter might be seen as originating from the (international)
public law regime. However, the distinctiveness of the global human rights
regimes when it comes to global law is, as we will see in the final section,
not so much linked to its origins within public law as to the way it provides a
self-reflexive constitution of global law.
Global supply chains have become a central piece of infrastructure of the
global economy. A typical definition of a supply chain characterizes it as `a
system of organizations, people, activities, information, and resources
involved in moving a product or service from supplier to customer.'60 A
global supply chain furthermore implies that the chain crosses boundaries.
From the background outlined above, this definition might be rephrased in
the following manner:
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A network stretching from suppliers to customers which is engaged in the
extraction, transmission and incorporation of condensed social components,
that is, capital, products and persons, from one societal context to another
which can be either upstream or downstream or a combination hereof and
implying boundary crossings, as part of the production of economic processes
as well as the re-production of societal conditions allowing for the production
of economic processes.
Global supply chains can furthermore be distinguished from global supply-
chain management, which might be defined as the second-order dynamic
stabilization of global supply chains through organizational, managerial, and
legal instruments with the objective of increasing the probability of
extraction, transmission, and incorporation of condensed social components
with economic value from one social context to another. The term `dynamic
stabilization' is crucial here, as it implies that the second-order stabilizing
layer itself is moving, but at a slower pace than the focal first-order processes
that it is oriented towards. The distinction between supply chains and supply-
chain management is therefore tightly linked to the distinction between
cognitive and normative structures of expectation in so far as cognitive
expectations are constantly changing while normative expectations are
characterized by a higher level of stability. In contrast to the Luhmannian
view concerning the constancy, that is, the non-changeable characteristics of
normative expectations, it should, however, be noted that normative
expectations also change over time, only at a slower pace than cognitive
expectations. Under modern conditions, the function of constitutions might
therefore be understood to be its orientation towards bridging the time gap
between first-order cognitive expectations and second-order normative
expectations.61
Global supply chains are typically understood as a post-war phenomenon
which gained increased relevance from the early 1980s onwards through a
fundamental reconceptualization, implying increased formalization as well
as the emergence of (self-)reflective formations, through the emergence of
the educational, legal, and organizational praxes specifically dealing with
global supply chains. The post-war `invention' of global supply chains was,
however, largely a `re-invention', as supply chains have, of course, been a
constitutive element of commerce from day one just as global supply chains
have been running at least since the emergence of European colonialism in
the late fifteenth century. For example, the slave trade coming out of Africa
also implied complex supply chains for the Arabic world as well as the
Americas.62 The organizational dimension of colonialism might furthermore
be considered as a particular form of global supply-chain management, as
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the core purpose of colonialism was the extraction, transmission, and
incorporation of condensed social components with a predominantly, albeit
not exclusively, economic value. The central societal transformation related
to the emergence of the contemporary form of global supply chains is
therefore to be found in the structural transformation away from centre/
periphery-organized colonialism to functionally-differentiated sectorial
regimes within the global economic system.
In this context, tightly woven second-order normative frameworks have
emerged which have global supply chains as their point of orientation. A
focus point has been the `principled approach to doing business' outlined in
the ten principles of the UN Global Compact, which covers areas such as
human rights, labour, environment, and anti-corruption.63 Similar
frameworks have been developed by UNCTAD and the OECD, just as
NGOs and, not least, multinational firms engaged in global supply chains
themselves have developed extensive normative frameworks aimed at
regulating and stabilizing such processes.64
Luhmannian functional equivalence, which is not to be equalled with
classical functionalism aÁ la Durkheim, Malinowski, Merton or Parsons, has
three implications: (i) that a given problem can be addressed in multiple
ways; (ii) that the essential problem for social systems is to connect to the
next future operation; and (iii) that function systems seek to expand, thereby
universalizing, their reach.65 Against this background, when considered as
in-between structures oriented towards the problem of establishing a repro-
ductive chain of extraction, transmission, and incorporation, colonialism and
global supply chains might be considered functionally equivalent structures,
as they are aimed at addressing the same problem. The contemporary form of
global supply chains emerged in the wake of decolonialization acting as
`substitutes' for the type of extraction, transmission, and incorporation that
unfolded through colonialism. This image is reinforced through the asym-
metric relationship between upstream and downstream flows in both settings.
Upstream is defined here as a move towards the end receiver, that is, the
consumer, of social components which are being increasingly condensed in
the process of flowing upstream, while flow downstream characterizes the
opposite movement.
S130
63 UN Global Compact, at <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/
principles>.
64 See, for example, L.C. Backer, `Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient
Systems of Global Private Lawmaking: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator' (2007) 37
Connecticut Law Rev. 1739.
65 For a pedagogical explanation of the concept of functional equivalence, see M.
Hanna, `Between Law and Transnational Social Movement Organizations: Stabilizing
Expectations of Global Public Goods' (2017) 44 J. of Law and Society 345, at 352 ff.
More generally, see, also, N. Luhmann, Zweckbegriff und SystemrationalitaÈt: UÈ ber
die Funktion von Zwecken in sozialen Systemen (1973/1968); Stichweh, op. cit., n. 7.
ß 2018 The Author. Journal of Law and Society ß 2018 Cardiff University Law School
FROM COLONIAL LAW TO HUMAN RIGHTS:
CONSTITUTIONALIZING CONNECTIVITY
Considerable variation can be observed between the legal foundations of, for
example, Belgian, British, Danish, Dutch, French, German, Spanish, and
Portuguese colonial law, thereby opening up another `yet to be developed'
scholarly field of comparative colonial law.66 A common feature of
colonialism in its various forms was, however, that it obtained a second-
order normative, that is, legal, stabilization through the principles of
dominium (ownership), ius gentium (the law of peoples), and bellum iustum
(just war).67 For the economic dimension of colonialism, the central element
was the development of a horizontal network of dominium based upon
contracts and globally enforceable property rights combined with an equally
global principle of unhindered commerce and access to resources. This
upstream economic orientation was furthermore combined with a down-
stream principle concerning unhindered access for Christian missionary
activities. Instead of annexing territory, global capitalist exchanges and the
transmission of religious values thereby became the legally-structured
foundation of colonialism, making an upstream and downstream `right to
extraction, transmission, and incorporation' upon the basis of connectivity
norms, the core principle on which global exchanges relied.68 However, due
to the distinction between Christians and non-Christians on which the norms
of connectivity relied, they opened up for and reinforced fundamentally
asymmetric exchanges.
For the first phase of colonialism running from the late fifteenth century
to the nationalization of the Dutch East India Company in 1800, the French
conquest of Algeria from 1830 onwards, and the nationalization of the
British East India Company in 1858, private law principles of commercial
law provided the normative underpinning of colonialism. This only changed
gradually with the increased transformation of colonialism into directly
state-driven endeavours which increasingly shifted colonialism towards
direct territorial conquest and rule. This was, for example, reflected in the
series of wars from 1821±1895 through which Dutch East India was trans-
formed from a collection of more or less secure trading-posts into an entity
characterized by the exercise of widespread territorial control; the
consolidation of British rule in India through both direct and indirect means
in the mid-nineteenth century; and the colonization of the inner parts of
Africa from the late 1870s onwards, a development which gave the central
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impetus for the development of modern international law, providing a
different normative underpinning to global connectivity while running in a
complementary fashion to the previous developed principles of private
colonialism. This shift implied an increased emphasis on the civilizing
responsibility of colonialism in a manner which went beyond the previous
right to evangelism, and emphasized issues such as `societal progress' and
`modernization' instead.69
Only with the third phase of globalization emerging in the post-war era
did the combined element of global supply chains and modern human rights
become the central factual and contra-factual infrastructure of global
commerce. The history of global human rights is a long one which, in its
modern version, can be traced back to at least the `Atlantic Revolutions', the
revolutionary wave unfolding throughout Europe, and North and South
America in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.70 Specifically
for the global reach of human rights, the anti-slave trade movement has
furthermore been identified as central,71 while the opposite case has also
been made on the basis of the view that a fundamental shift in the purpose
and set-up of human rights occurred in the latter half of the twentieth century
as a consequence of decolonization.72
While the history of global human rights can thus be considered as one
which is characterized by both continuities and discontinuities, the debate so
far has been conducted by legal historians with little emphasis on sociology
of law perspectives on the changed status of human rights in the third wave
of globalization. Within established and institutionally stable democracies,
constitutionally guaranteed basic rights are legal rights intrinsically linked to
their operational realization within the legal system upon the basis of the
dual function of securing functional differentiation and individual auton-
omy.73 Global human rights have a different dual function both of which can
be conceived of in constitutional terms: first, to secure the stabilization, and
with it the legitimization, of regimes of transfer on a global scale. This, for
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example, is the case within company internal approaches74 as well as broader
regime-based approaches to human rights as embedded in strategies of
corporate social responsibility.75 Such strategies are aimed at generalizing
communication across contextual boundaries, thereby allowing for multi-
contextual embeddedness, that is, the simultaneous compatibility of con-
densed social components with multiple social environments at different
stages of a supply-chain stream. The ten principles of the UN Global
Compact and similar frameworks in such contexts are intended to provide a
second-order stabilization of the legal and managerial set-up of globally-
unfolding economic processes, thereby giving them a character as
constitutional principles establishing hierarchies of norms vis-aÁ-vis such
processes.
Secondly, in contrast to previous colonial forms of justification and
normative stabilization, contemporary human rights-based forms are not
formally based upon an asymmetric distinction, such as the colonial distinc-
tion between Christian and non-Christian. Factually, however, they tend to
be characterized by inbuilt asymmetries in terms of resources and the
articulation of values and direction.76 This gives global human rights an
aspirational function in a broader societal as well as in a narrow legal sense
in relation to their own realization. Societally, global humans rights can be
seen as oriented towards the realization of functional differentiation and
individual autonomy in the segments of the world which are characterized by
communicative crossbreeding and creolization. Legally, what gives it a
strategic position of constitutional worth within the legal system is its
function as a framework for the transfer of transfers, in so far as the function
of a global human rights regime is to facilitate the transfer of legal norms
which are aimed at facilitating broader societal transfers of, for example, an
economic or religious nature. Or to put it differently, the contra-factual
orientation of the global human rights regime is to transpose legal norms
which originally emerged in the Western world on a global scale, that is, to
universalize the legal system of Western law,77 thereby constitutionalizing
the legal system's own global connectivity.
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CONCLUSION
Within the framework of systems theory, an elaborated and sophisticated
theory of global societal constitutionalism has been developed. While this
approach has provided essential insights into the possibility of constitu-
tionalizing global processes, this contribution has developed an alternative
perspective, standing orthogonal to the systems theoretical approach, on the
basis of an epistemological switch from a focus on differentiation to a focus
on connectivity. The core thesis advanced is that global legal settings are
characterized by a relative predominance of connectivity norms as opposed
to coherence or possibility norms. Connectivity norms are oriented towards
the facilitation of transfers of legally condensed social components of, for
example, an economic or religious nature from one legally structured
societal context to another. Connectivity norms were the predominant form
of norms in colonialism as well as in contemporary global governance. But
while reproducing identical functions of transfer, they rely on fundamentally
different normative set-ups. They are therefore to be understood as
functional but not as normative equivalents. Colonialism relied on highly
asymmetric distinctions, namely, between Christians and non-Christians,
while contemporary global governance subscribes to symmetric distinctions
as embodied in the global human rights regime ± a human rights regime
which obtains a second-order constitutionalizing function through its role in
facilitating the transfer of law itself.
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